This paper considers a simple adaptive learning rule in Bayesian games with binary actions where players employ threshold strategies. Global convergence results are given for supermodular games and potential games. If there is a unique equilibrium, players' strategies converge almost surely to it. Even if there is not, in potential games and in the two-player case in supermodular games, any limit point of the learning process must be an equilibrium. In particular, if equilibria are isolated, the learning process converges to one of them almost surely.
Introduction
Bayesian games are widely used in Economics, for example in the study of auctions and public goods provision. Rather little is known about whether players are likely to learn to play the equilibria involved in such games. This paper studies a simple adaptive learning model in the context of binary action Bayesian games and gives conditions for its convergence to equilibrium.
The class of Bayesian games with binary actions is restrictive but is widely used in practice. It includes for example, but is not restricted to, many of the applications of the theory of global games stimulated by the work of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) -see for example the survey by Morris and Shin (2003) . It has the advantage that the form of the equilibria is fairly simple: in the examples studied here players play one action below a certain threshold, the other above it. If players cannot learn to play equilibrium in such games, it is unlikely they can do so in more complex ones.
Learning in a Bayesian game is not simple. A player must learn to play a strategy which specifies an action for each possible signal he may receive. Moreover in attempting to learn about other players, he is likely to be able only to observe his own past signals and their actions, not their strategies. One might imagine that the player would attempt to infer his opponents' strategies from past data but, especially if the space of signals is continuous, this is a non-trivial inference problem. Furthermore one might not even wish to assume that the player knows the distribution from which he and his opponents draw their signals.
This paper examines a simpler adaptive rule. In the current environment optimal strategies are specified by a threshold. It is assumed that each player employs a threshold strategy and adjusts it in the direction suggested by past play. Even such a rule is not entirely straightforward as he must estimate the direction in which to move. The paper shows that this can be achieved by a simple scheme. It is assumed that each player adjusts his threshold up or down according to the realized difference in payoffs between the two actions, making a larger adjustment if they receive a signal closer to their threshold.
Two features of the learning rule merit highlighting. Firstly, it is perhaps in the spirit of 'directional learning', as suggested by Selten and Buchta (1998) . Players do not pick best responses at each instant but rather move in a direction that will improve their payoffs. Given the difficulties of even computing the other player's strategy, let alone a best response, this does not seem unreasonable.
Secondly, the ideas in the paper may also be linked to those 'similarity', as studied for example by Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) . The latter suggest that agents will base decisions on previous cases, weighting evidence by its perceived similarity to the case at hand. In the current paper, players only observe one signal at a time. In order to estimate payoffs at signals they do not observe, they must use observations of 'similar' signals, weighting them by their proximity to the signal at which payoffs are to be estimated.
The paper gives global convergence results for games with binary actions and strategic complementarities. If there is a unique equilibrium then players' strategies will converge almost surely to it if players use the learning rule proposed. In the two-player case, even if there is not a unique equilibrium, any limit point of the learning process is an equilibrium. In particular, if equilibria are locally unique play must converge to an equilibrium. It also shows that these results hold in potential games with monotone equilibria. The results for the case of multiple equilibria in the latter setting do not require the restriction to two players. The proofs use ideas from the theory of passive stochastic approximation introduced by Härdle and Nixdorf (1987) .
One could of course take the view that players are fully rational and so can easily compute the equilibrium. This is the viewpoint taken in the literature on global games. Experimental work by Heinemann et al. (2004) throws doubt on this.
In the experiments reported players do not leap immediately to equilibrium or in some cases ever play according to the equilibrium prediction.
Learning in games has of course been widely studied. A good survey can be found in Fudenberg and Levine (1998) . Most of this work has studied learning in environments without private information. Much of it has also restricted attention to normal-form games, where strategies are observable. Neither feature is appropriate here.
An exception is the work on perturbed fictitious play, for example of Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) or Benaïm and Hirsch (1999) . This work studies convergence to equilibria of normal-form games, using Harsanyi's interpretation of mixed equilibria as Bayesian equilibria. In these games each player receives an independent perturbation to their payoffs in each period. Since perturbations are independent, the signal one player receives tells him nothing about the likely action of another player. The only feature a player needs to estimate is the probability with which his opponents choose their actions, which he can do by looking at their frequency in past play. Learning with independent signals is, therefore, comparatively straightforward.
Learning is much more complex when, as here, signals are correlated. Now a player's signal does provide information about the signals other players have received and therefore the actions they are likely to play. It is no longer sufficient, therefore, to look at the unconditional frequency with which actions were played in the past. Rather the player needs to know how his signal alters the probabilities of different actions being played. 1 Some of the work on convergence to Rational Expectations equilibrium (see for example Bray (1982) ) can be interpreted as studying convergence to a Bayesian equilibrium. The environment there, however, is non-strategic. Dekel et al. (2004) discuss what learning might imply about beliefs of players in Bayesian games but do not discuss any specific learning rules or convergence.
The paper most closely related to the current one is Steiner and Stewart (2006) . They consider a model of learning by similarity in the context of a global game. The spirit of the analysis is similar but there are a number of differences. As in this paper players use observations of similar signals to estimate payoffs to actions. They do not however use a threshold learning rule and restrict attention to global games. In their paper, convergence is to a perturbed version of the true equilibrium rather than to equilibrium as here. The relationship between the two papers is explored in greater detail in Section 5. Carlsson (2004) formulates a learning model which is similar in spirit to that of Steiner and Stewart (2006) but does not investigate its convergence. Chen and Gazzale (2005) and Sarin and Vahid (2004) analyze in an experimental setting learning rules in which players revise their estimates of the payoffs of unplayed actions according to their 'similarity' to the action actually played. They analyze complete information games, so the underlying model is rather different, but the idea is similar in spirit. They do not analyze the theoretical convergence properties of their models but focus on exploring the experimental data.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the general environment studied and Section 3 gives two examples of it. Section 4 explains the learning rule. Section 5 gives the main convergence result. Section 6 discusses extensions. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
This section describes the general class of games to be studied. The first sub-section outlines the main general technical assumptions. The second details the assumptions of supermodularity made.
General Environment
It will be initially assumed that there are two players i = 1, 2. The case of more than two players will be considered in Section 6. Each player has a binary action set A i = {0, 1}, i = 1, 2. The implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 6. a = (a 1 , a 2 ) will be used to denote a vector of actions of the players.
As is standard in Bayesian games it is assumed that each player has certain possible types, belonging to T i for player i. Payoffs may also depend on the state of nature, which lies in T 0 .
To avoid encumbering the analysis with technical details it will be assumed that the set of types and payoffs are bounded. Cases with unbounded types and payoffs can be arbitrarily well approximated by large but bounded type spaces and payoffs. In any event, the analysis can be extended to unbounded types and payoffs and this case is treated in the working paper version, Beggs (2005) .
T i is therefore assumed to be a finite interval [t i ,t i ], i = 1, 2 and T 0 a compact subset of some Euclidean space. The overall type space, T , is the Cartesian product of T 0 , T 1 and T 2 . A typical element of T will be denoted by t = (t 0 ,t 1 ,t 2 ).
The joint distribution of types on T is assumed to have a bounded density g with respect to Lebesque measure which is continuous in t 1 and t 2 and with a marginal density, f , on T 1 × T 2 which is strictly positive. The assumption that f is strictly positive guarantees that observations are always possible at every point.
For most of the paper T 0 is not of direct interest and it would be enough to make assumptions directly about realized payoffs and payoffs conditional on t 1 and t 2 and not make assumptions directly about T 0 (see Beggs (2005) ). For completeness these are made here in order to have assumptions on primitives.
The realized payoff to player i, y i (a,t 0 ,t i ), depends on the vector of actions chosen a, the state of nature t 0 and i's own signal, t i . The assumption that it does not depend on the other player's signal is not formally necessary but as discussed in Section 4 makes the observability assumptions in the learning model more plausible. As noted above it is assumed that y i is bounded, i = 1, 2.
Δy i (a j ,t 0 ,t i ) denotes the difference in payoffs to player i from taking action 1 rather than action 0. For most of the analysis it would be enough if Δy rather than y is bounded. Denote by π i (a 1 , a 2 ,t 1 ,t 2 ) the expected payoff to player i conditional on the players' signals. That is
where g(t 0 |t 1 ,t 2 ) is the conditional density of t 0 given t 1 and t 2 . Let
denote the incremental expected payoff to taking action 1 rather than zero. The learning rule will estimate payoffs for a given type by using information about payoffs realized when similar signals have been received. For this to be successful it needs to be assumed that payoffs are smooth enough in the signals. It is therefore assumed that Assumption 1 g and y i , i = 1, 2, are differentiable with respect to t 1 and t 2 with derivatives continuous in t.
Note that by the bounded convergence theorem this also implies that f and π i have the same properties.
Supermodularity
In addition to the general assumptions made, further assumptions are introduced to ensure that equilibria are characterized by thresholds at which players switch between actions.
Assumption 2 Δy i (a j ,t 0 ,t i ) is strictly increasing in a j and increasing in t 0 and t i for i = 1, 2.
Assumption 2 expresses the assumption that payoffs are supermodular in actions and types (given that the action space is binary). The assumption that Δy i is strictly increasing in a j is used in the proof of convergence of the algorithm.
It will also be assumed that the higher the signal one player receives the more likely it is that the other player and nature have received high signals. Recall that a probability distribution μ on R n dominates another distribution μ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, μ st μ , if μ(A) ≥ μ (A) for all increasing sets A, where A is increasing if x ∈ A implies that y ∈ A for all y ≥ x using the componentwise order on R n . In the case n = 1, it is equivalent (see Topkis (1998) Lemma 3.9.1) to the assumption that if G and G denote the distribution functions of μ and
Let μ(t 0 ,t j |t i ) be the conditional distribution of t 0 and t j given t i , j = i.
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for Assumption 2 is that signals are affiliated (see for example Milgrom and Weber (1982) Theorem 5).
Assumption 3 implies that F i is decreasing in t i for i = 1, 2, where F i (t j |t i ) is the conditional distribution function of t j given t i . Lemma 1 below would still hold if instead of Assumptions 2 and 3 one assumed this directly and that Δπ i (a j ,t i ,t j ) is strictly increasing in a j and increasing in t i and t j for i = 1, 2, j = i. The latter is not implied by Assumptions 2 and 3 but follows if types are affiliated (see for example Athey (2002) ). It would be enough to assume this directly.
A strategy for player i is a map σ i : T i −→ A i . Assumptions 2 and 3 imply (see for example Topkis (1998) Corollary 3.9.1(a)) that
increasing in t i for each i, where E denotes expectation.
It follows from Lemma 1 that each player always has an increasing best response to an increasing strategy and so, under Assumptions 1-3, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in monotonic strategies (see for example Athey (2001) Lemma 3). There may be other, non-monotonic, equilibria.
An increasing strategy can be characterized by a cutoff k: play action 1 if t i > k, action 0 otherwise. A monotonic equilibrium can therefore be specified by a pair of cutoffs, k 1 and k 2 , one for each player.
Provided cutoffs are interior to the interval of types, players must be indifferent between their two actions at the cutoff. The following is sufficient to guarantee that equilibrium cutoffs are indeed interior:
Assumption 4 amounts to the assumption that for low enough signals action 0 is the best action to play for a player regardless of the other player's actions and for high enough signals action 1 is the best action to play.
More formally, let Δπ i (k 1 , k 2 ) denote the expected difference in payoffs between actions 0 and 1 to player i conditional on his having type k i and the other player adopting cutoff k j ( j = i). Under Assumptions 1-4, Lemma 1 holds and
Lemma 2 k i is a best response to k j if and only if
Lemma 2 implies that equilibria can be found as the zeroes of an equation and one does not have to worry about inequality constraints.
Two Examples
This section gives two simple examples of the class of games considered.
Example 1 ( A Public Goods Game)
Figure 1
Consider the game in Figure 1 . It can be thought of as a simple public goods game with voluntary contributions of the kind studied by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) . There are two players and each player can either contribute (action 0) and not (action 1). If both players contribute then the project goes ahead yielding a gross payoff of 1 to each player, otherwise it does not and they each receive zero. The cost of contribution to player i is t i , so net payoffs are as shown in Figure 1 . Each player observes only his own cost level. t i are the types of the players. There are no public signals, so t 0 is trivial ( a constant). Suppose that t 1 and t 2 are drawn from a distribution with joint distribution function F(t 1 ,t 2 ) and density function f . Let the support of
∞ > t i > 1 and −∞ < t i < 0 for i = 1, 2. Negative values of costs are allowed and may be taken to reflect 'altruism' or equivalently that there is some minimal benefit to contributing to the project even if the other player does not.
Let F j (t j |t i ) be the cumulative distribution function of t j given t i . It is straightforward to check that if F j (t j |t i ) is decreasing in t i for every t j , that is the higher a player's own cost the higher the other player's cost is likely to be, then there is an interior equilibrium of the form:
k i is determined by the pair of equations
It is natural to ask whether players can learn to play such an equilibrium. After the game has been played once, if each player can observe the action of the other he can compute the ex post difference in payoffs to actions 0 and 1. In the case of player i, this will be
At the cutoff, k i , the difference in realized payoffs should have expectation zero ex ante. This suggests raising the cutoff if action 0 has higher realized payoff than action 1. Since the observed signal, t i , may not equal the equilibrium cutoff, this suggests revising the cutoff less if t i is far from k i as behavior at t i may be a poor guide to behavior at k i . A formal model on these lines is presented in Section 4. Two features of this model are important in the future analysis: firstly that F j (t j |t i ) is decreasing in t i , secondly that the relative payoff to not contributing (action 1) is higher if the other player does not contribute and increasing in own cost. The second is a supermodularity assumption. It implies that higher actions (here not contributing) become more attractive the higher the action taken by the other player and the higher the signal received by the player himself. In other words Assumption 2 holds in the current model. The first assumption means that the higher cost one player has, the more likely it is that the other player has high costs. This is simply Assumption 3 in the current context. This is clearly true if costs are independently distributed. This not necessary, however, and the current model allows for players' costs to be correlated. These two assumptions guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in threshold strategies. They will also be important in the analysis of the convergence of the learning rule.
Example 2 (Global Games)
Another example of the class of games considered is the global games considered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003) . Consider the following simple example drawn from Morris and Shin (2003) shown in Figure 2 .
When payoffs are commonly observed, the unique equilibrium is for both players to play action 0 if θ < 0 and action 1 if θ > 1. For 0 < θ < 1, there are multiple equilibria: both playing 0 is an equilibrium, so is both playing 1 and there is a mixed equilibrium.
In the literature on global games each player only observes a noisy signal of his payoffs. 2 Morris and Shin (2003) consider the case when player i observes t i = θ + u i when u i is Normal with mean zero and variance σ 2 with u 1 and u 2 independent. In the case when players have an improper prior for θ (the uniform density on the real line), they show that there is a unique equilibrium where player i plays
t i is the type of player i in the terminology of Section 2. As noted there, although types are assumed bounded there, this is not essential for the analysis.
The state of nature θ corresponds to t 0 . In Section 2 it was assumed that the distribution of types is described by a probability measure and so an improper prior is not allowed. The qualitative features of the example are, however, preserved with a proper but highly spread out prior. The example fits into the current framework with this qualification.
Various authors have extended these results (see Morris and Shin (2003) for a survey) and others have criticized their robustness (see for example Hellwig (2003) ). This is not the focus here. For the purposes of this paper the interesting feature of the model is that it is a Bayesian game where players pursue a simple cutoff strategy: play action 1 if their signal exceeds some value k i .
The form of the rule is simple yet one might ask how easy it is for players to learn to use such a rule. The arguments given by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003) are largely deductive in nature. Experiments in Heinemann et al. (2004) give ambiguous support to the model. Players do not seem to converge immediately to the solution implied by deductive reasoning. They do, however, seem to employ threshold strategies.
One might wonder whether naïve players can learn to play such an equilibrium. Morris and Shin (2003) note that if the game in Figure 2 is considered as a normal-form game it is supermodular in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . It follows from the results in the latter paper that if each player observes each other's choice of cutoff at each stage, many simple learning rules will converge to equilibrium. The assumption that cutoffs are observable seems doubtful. The current paper asks whether players can learn to play the equilibrium when they simply observe their own signals and payoffs and the other player's actions.
If players can observe θ after the game has been played, and the action of the other player, they can compute the ex post difference in the realized payoffs of actions 0 and 1. For player i this is
Again this suggests raising player i's equilibrium cutoff if action 0 has higher realized payoff, but raising it less if the observed signal is far from k i . Section 4 presents a formal model on these lines.
Two features in this example, corresponding to Assumptions 2 and 3, will play an important role in the later analysis. In the first place, the gain to playing action 1 rather than action 0 is increasing in θ for a fixed action of the other player and for fixed θ is higher if the other player takes action 1 rather than action 0. In other words, payoffs are supermodular. In the second place, the higher the signal one player observes the more likely it is that the other player has observed a high signal and that θ is high. Together these features imply that each player will use a cutoff strategy. Supermodularity will also be used to prove convergence of the learning rule studied.
The Learning Model

Motivation
The idea pursued is that players pursue a simple adaptive rule and adjust their cutoffs.
The game is played repeatedly at stages n = 1, 2, . . .. At each stage each player observes their own type at that stage, t i (n), but not the type of the other player. Types are drawn at each stage from the distribution specified in Section 2 and draws are independent between stages. Each player chooses an action according to their current cutoff, k i (n). After each stage each player observes the payoffs that each action would have achieved if he had played it. They do not, however, observe the payoff they would have received if they had had another type.
In the context of the Example 2 of Section 3, the assumptions on what is observed amount to the assumption that after each stage each player observes the aggregate state, θ , and the action of the other player. The player can therefore calculate the payoff he would have achieved if he had taken a different action. Although he can observe θ he cannot calculate the payoff he would have received if he had had a different type as the other player might then also have had a different type -types may be correlated -and so taken a different action. The type of the other player is assumed not to be observed, though in some games it may be deduced from payoffs. F ormally, recall that the payoff of action a i to player i depends on the state of nature, his own type and the action taken by the other player: y i (a i , a j ,t 0 ,t i ). It is assumed that at stage n player i observes his own type t i and, after actions have been chosen, the state of nature t 0 and the action of the other player. It follows that after each stage he can calculate the value of y i for different values of a i . Denote the latter byỹ i (a i , n) and the realized difference in payoffs between the two actions 0 and 1 by
As noted in the Introduction, one might attempt to estimate how the expected payoff to each action depends on current type, that is the map t i −→ E(ΔΠ i |t i ), where ΔΠ i denotes the difference in payoffs to actions 0 and 1 given the strategy of the other player. This is potentially complex and also unnecessary. As noted in Section 3, the experiments of Heinemann et al. (2004) suggest that although players do not leap to equilibrium they do employ threshold strategies. Given this, all that needs to be estimated for each player is the optimal cutoff, that is the point where 
Figure 3
Intuitively this is straightforward to do. One simply looks at the difference in expected payoffs at the current cutoff k i (n) -see Figure 3 . If these are positive, action 1 yields a higher payoff than action 0 when the signal is k i (n), so the cutoff should be lowered, and similarly if they are negative. Of course one can only observe realized not expected payoffs but this should not matter in the long run.
More serious is the fact that the player does not control his type. He may wish to estimate payoffs at k i (n) but his realized type may be completely different. If the number of signals were finite this would not be a problem. The player could simply wait until he receives a signal of k i (n) and revise his cutoff in the light of realized payoffs. Cutoffs would therefore be revised according a rule of the form
where Δy i denotes the realized difference in payoffs at stage n and α n measures the extent to which cutoffs are adjusted at stage n.
The expected change in cutoffs would then be given by
where Δπ i (k 1 , k 2 ) denotes the expected difference in payoffs between actions 0 and 1 to player i conditional on his having type k i and the other player adopting cutoff
Here signals are continuous, however, and so there is probability zero of receiving a signal exactly equal to k i (n). One cannot therefore use this scheme. One can, though, implement something like very like it by revising cutoffs in the light of payoffs obtained when signals near k i (n) are received. If payoffs are smooth enough then nearby points give a reasonable guide to payoffs at k i (n). More generally one could consider using payoffs at any realized type but giving signals near k i (n) more weight since since payoffs at types far from k i (n) may be far from those at k i (n).
The Learning Rule
An adjustment rule of the following form is therefore considered. At each stage player i observes the realized difference in payoffs between actions Δy i . He adjusts k i according to the rule
where K( ) is a kernel function, that is it is a function from the real line to itself satisfying
and α n and h n are positive numbers satisfying
K weights observations according to the distance of the signal received from k i (n), in line with the intuition above. This can also be interpreted in terms of 'similarity'. K( ) can be thought of as measuring the degree of similarity between the current observation and k i (n). Observations are weighted according to their similarity.
(11)(a) simply states that the total weight available adds up to one. (b) states that the mean weight given to observations is zero. (c) states that its variance is finite. K is not required to be non-negative, although for an interpretation as weighting function it is most natural to think of it as so. These are fairly standard assumptions in non-parametric estimation. Other variations are possible. See for example Härdle (1990) for discussion.
α n governs the extent of adjustment of cutoffs at each stage. If the system is to converge then this needs to become small, so that random shocks in payoffs do not always perturb it away from equilibrium. On the other hand α n must not become small too quickly or initial bad luck may mean the system stays away from equilibrium forever. (12)(a) guarantees that the latter cannot happen. (12)(b) and (c) imply that ∑ n α 2 n < ∞, which ensures the former cannot happen. h n is a scale factor which allows the weight put on observations to be adjusted over time. The smaller h n , the more weight is put on observations at signals near k i (n). This is illustrated in Figure 4 . 
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Figure 4
Using observations on payoffs at points other than k i (n) introduces a distortion into the estimates and this needs to be eliminated if the system is to converge to the Nash equilibrium. Making h n small achieves this. On the other hand if h n becomes small too quickly then the system is updated rarely and its motion may be dominated by the random shocks which occur when it is. These two factors yield conditions (12)(b) and (c), as explained in more detail below. (12) is satisfied by for example α n = 1/n and h n = 1/n γ with 0 < γ < 1/2.
α n , h n and K( ) are assumed the same for both players but this is not important. A slight modification of the rule above will in fact be used since it is assumed the type-space is bounded. One needs to modify the learning rule slightly to ensure that the thresholds cannot be driven outside the type space by a large payoff realization and then become stuck there (no signals are received outside the type space). If it is assumed that players know the lowest and highest signals they can receive, then a natural modification would be to let
and set
or equivalently
where Π T i is the projection onto T i defined in (14). Asymptotically this makes no difference as Assumption 4 ensures that the system points inwards at the boundaries. It is not needed in the case of unbounded type spaces but one then requires stronger assumptions to ensure the system remains bounded (see Beggs (2005) ).
Discussion
If h n is small, then almost no weight is put on observations that are not near to k i (n), so the evolution of the system should be similar to that of (8). (10) can be understood further by writing it in a form suggested by (9)
where f i is the marginal density of t i . The change in k i (n) equals the expected difference in payoffs between the two actions if a signal of k i (n) is received times the probability (density) of receiving a signal of k i (n) plus two error terms. The first error term
reflects the bias introduced from the fact that adjustments are made when signals are other than k i (n) are received. As h n becomes smaller more and more weight is put on signals near k i (n). If payoffs and the density of signals are smooth enough the bias will be of order h n . Condition (12)(b) guarantees that this bias term is asymptotically negligible. The second error term
reflects the fact that payoffs are random, so they do not necessarily equal their mean. From (10) it follows that if K and payoffs are bounded these terms are of order 1/h n . Condition (12)(c) guarantees that ∑ α n ε i (n) converges and so the random payoff shocks again do not affect asymptotic behavior.
If α n is small, the system changes slowly so it is plausible its long-run behavior can be determined by considering the long-run behavior oḟ
The assumption that the density of f is strictly positive implies that the zeroes of this system occur precisely at the points where the conditional payoffs to each action are equal, that is at equilibrium cutoffs (see Lemma 2).
K does not enter (19). This is because as h n becomes small the system, under the assumptions given, becomes close to that where cutoffs are only revised when a signal is received at k i , whatever the precise form of K. Essentially, to first order the bias term η i (n) is negligible. The form of K can, however, affect higher order properties of the system such as the rate of convergence to equilibrium.
The scheme in (10) is much simpler than trying to estimate the entire dependence of payoffs on types. It requires, though, a modicum of sophistication and so players cannot be completely naïve if they are to converge to the true equilibrium.
A scheme of this form is often referred to as 'passive stochastic approximation' and was first studied by Härdle and Nixdorf (1987) . The adjective 'passive' is employed as, in contrast to ordinary stochastic approximation, agents cannot control the signals they observe.
In the usual stochastic approximation procedure, the agent observes the system z n = m(x n ) + ε n and wishes to find a zero of m. ε n has mean zero conditional on x n . He observes z n , but not ε n , and can choose at each stage the sample points x n . He adjusts the sample points according to the rule:
Provided that α n converges to zero fast enough that random noise washes out (∑ n α 2 n < ∞) but not so fast that initial shocks can dominate behavior (∑ α n = ∞) the long-run behavior of the system can be analyzed by the ordinary differential equationẋ
and under reasonable conditions the system converges to a point x * such that m(x * ) = 0.
The system considered is similar to that above but in the 'passive' case the fact that the agent cannot control which signals (x or t) are drawn each period has two consequences. First there is an extra source of noise or bias, η i , resulting from the fact that the agent samples from points other than the current cutoff. Secondly, asymptotically the agent changes the cutoff only when signals are near the current cutoff, so (19) has a term giving the probability of observing a signal near that point. Both schemes are of course stochastic approximation schemes but the adjective 'passive' is useful to highlight the fact that here the agent cannot control the signals he receives.
In more general Bayesian games without threshold equilibria one would usually need to estimate the conditional payoff to each action for every possible signal. For example in the case with binary actions one would need to estimate the function t i −→ E(ΔΠ i |t i ). One can employ a scheme similar to the one used here. Estimates of expected payoffs at any signal can be revised by using realized payoffs at the signal received in the current period. The latter are weighted according to their distance to the point at which payoffs are being estimated in a similar manner to that used here.
For example one could use a scheme of the form
here Δπ(t i , n) is the estimate at stage n of E(ΔΠ i |t i ). This is a recursive kernel estimator. See for example Révész (1977) and Gyorfi et al. (2002) Chapter 25 for details. t i (n) is the signal received at stage n and Δy i (n) the realized difference in payoffs at that signal. The observation is used to update estimates at signals other than t i (n) according to their similarity. Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) consider the problem of ordering events by the relation at 'as least as likely as' and note that kernel estimation of a density function and in classification problems obeys the similarity axioms they propose. The problem in (22) is one of estimating a value rather a likelihood but at an intuitive level similar considerations apply, suggesting that kernel estimation can reasonably be thought of as a procedure consistent with notions of similarity.
The analysis in the current paper uses the general idea of kernel estimation but is much simpler since each player need only remember their current cutoff, not an estimate of an entire payoff function. An analysis of learning in more general Bayesian games would be of considerable interest but in the current paper attention is restricted to the case of threshold equilibria.
Convergence
This section gives conditions for convergence to equilibrium.
As noted in Section 4, the smoothness assumptions made on payoffs suggest that the long-run behavior of the system can be understood by analyzing the ordinary differential equation
An argument similar to that in Benaïm and Hirsch (1999) given in the Appendix shows that this is indeed the case. As noted, Assumption 4 implies that the projection does not affect long-run behavior.
To analyze the behavior of (23) it is helpful to write out its right-hand side more explicitly. If f i (t j |t i ) is the conditional distribution of t j given t i then the right hand side of (23) can be written as in the case i = 1 as
and similarly for i = 2. Now
The assumptions of supermodularity (Assumptions 2 and 3) imply that
In other words, if j raises his cutoff this lowers the relative payoff to playing action 1 rather than 0 at k i (and so i should raise his cutoff).
A differential equationẋ = φ (x) is said to be cooperative if
to be irreducible if the Jacobian matrix J =
is an irreducible matrix (in both cases for all x). 3 See for example Smith (1995) for further details.
(27) implies that (23) is cooperative and irreducible. It is known that if such an equation has a unique equilibrium point the system converges to it. This implies that the same is true of the learning rule. In the two-dimensional case (as here) an argument of Benaïm (2000) allows one to characterize limiting behavior of the learning rule even when equilibrium is not unique. The details can be found in the Appendix. 4
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1-4 (a) If the game has a unique equilibrium, players' cutoffs, (k 1 (n), k 2 (n)), converge to the equilibrium cutoffs almost surely.
(b) If there are multiple equilibria, then the set of limit points of (10) is contained in the set of equilibrium cutoffs almost surely. If equilibria are isolated then players' cutoffs converge to their values at one of the equilibria almost surely.
In the working paper version, Beggs (2005) , this result is extended to the case of unbounded type spaces. The scheme (10) with no projection operator is considered. In order to show that the system remains bounded a strengthened version of Assumption 4 is imposed: it assumed that action 0 (resp. 1) zero is dominant for all sufficiently low (high) signals and the gain from switching actions is bounded away from zero in those regions. One also needs to impose additional technical assumptions to ensure smoothness of H and the existence of appropriate moments, which are not needed in the current case of bounded type spaces and payoffs.
As noted in the Introduction Steiner and Stewart (2006) also use a model of learning based on similarity. As here, players weight observations by their closeness to the signal whose payoffs they wish to estimate. They do not, however, use a threshold learning rule but a compute a best response at each stage. It is assumed that they remember the entire history of realized payoffs when they do so. Here players simply summarize past experience in a single number, the current cutoff, and revise it each period in light of payoff realizations. The current rule is simpler and perhaps more appropriate for boundedly rational players. Another difference is that here players put more weight on nearby actions as time goes by, h n tends to zero, but there the weights are constant. As a result there is always some distortion in players' estimates even in the limit and so players do not converge to the Nash equilibrium, as they do here, but to a perturbed version of it. Their analysis is also restricted to the case of global games.
The discussion version of the paper, Beggs (2005) , discusses the asymptotic rate of convergence of the learning rule and shows that it is slower than that found (see Kaniovski and Young (1995) ) in the case of stochastic fictitious play, where payoffs are observed.
Extensions
This section considers extensions of the above results (a) to the case of more than two players, (b) to the case of more than two actions, (c) to other payoff functions.
More Than Two Players
Theorem 1 extends straightforwardly to the case of more than two players, so long as there is a unique equilibrium. The Assumptions of Section 2 generalize in an obvious way to the m player case. If there are multiple equilibria, it is no longer clear that play must converge to one of them. The special feature of the two player case is that the state space is two dimensional. In this case play must converge to the equilibrium set in a cooperative system. Benaïm (2000) conjectures in the context of ordinary stochastic approximation that this also holds in higher dimensions for systems satisfying (27) . If this is correct, then Theorem 1 would generalize fully.
More Than Two Actions
The results of the paper can in principle be extended to the case when there are more than two possible actions available.
Suppose for example that there are three actions. Under analogous assumptions to those in Section 3, there would be a range of realizations of types under which player 1 would play action 1, some action 2, others action 3. The natural way to extend the learning algorithm is to suppose that player 1 revises his cutoff between actions 1 and 2, k 12 1 , and between actions 2 and 3, k 23 1 in the manner of (10). There are two difficulties. In the first place, comparisons between adjacent actions may not be enough. For example, for some strategies of the other player, it may be undesirable to ever play action 2. In this case one would switch directly from action 1 to 3 at some cutoff. To deal with this one would also need to introduce the cutoff between actions 1 and 3, k 13 1 , as well. In principle, this is fine but if for some cutoffs of the other player it is optimal to play strategies 1,2 and 3 and others only 1 and 3, at the points where action 2 drops out there may be a lack of smoothness in payoff functions (more precisely the analogues of the H i ).
Secondly, even if the first difficulty does not arise, if (10) is applied independently to k 12 1 and k 23 1 , there is no guarantee that payoff realizations will ensure that k 12 1 (n) is always less than k 23 1 (n). One would need to constrain the algorithm in some way to ensure this is true. Beggs (2009) analyses a discrete-time model of learning in Normal-form Bayesian games in which cutoffs are adjusted in light of the payoff differences between neighboring actions but players project their strategies onto the set of monotone strategies. A similar device could be used here but this complication perhaps makes the learning model less attractive in this case.
Subject to these provisos the results could be extended, using the results of Kushner and Yin (1997) , for example, on projected algorithms. The technical details would need to be checked though. If there are more than two players, then the state space will have more than two dimensions so as in Theorem 3 convergence to equilibrium could only be expected if equilibrium is unique.
Other Payoff Functions
Supermodularity is used in two ways in the analysis in previous sections: (a) to guarantee the existence of monotone equilibria, (b) to ensure convergence of the learning algorithm. There are a number of other assumptions which would deliver (a), as discussed extensively by Athey (2001) . For example, it could be assumed that payoff functions are log-supermodular in types and actions and that types are affiliated (see for example Athey (2001) ). The analysis of (b) does, however, rest rather strongly on supermodularity, as it guarantees that (19) is a cooperative system.
It is possible, nevertheless, to extend the result somewhat. To see this note that (19) is essentially a gradient algorithm. If one definesπ i (k 1 , k 2 ) to be the (unconditional) expected payoff to player i if he employs cutoff k i and the other player employs cutoff k j , then it is straightforward to check (cf. the expression for H i in (25), that (19) is equivalent tok
The same is true if there are more than two players. Suppose now that, for each realization of types, the players play a potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) . That is there is a function U and functions φ i such that y i (t, a) = U(t, a) + φ i (t, a −i ) for all i, where a −i denotes the actions of players other than i. In other words, players receive identical payoffs up to an additive factor which does not affect the relative payoffs of their actions. (28) then becomesk
where V is the expected value of U as a function of the cutoffs. In this case, V acts as a Lyapounov function for (19) and, under some additional technical assumptions, this implies convergence of the learning algorithm to equilibrium. In order to ensure that a potential game has an equilibrium in monotone strategies one of course needs to impose assumptions on U. As noted above, it would for example be sufficient to assume that U is log-supermodular in types and actions and that types are affiliated. More generally, it is enough to assume that the following single crossing-property, which is a weakening of Lemma 1, is satisfied. Let EΔU(t i ) denote the expected incremental payoff to choosing action 1 rather than 0 when player i receives signal t i given the strategies of the other players (suppressed for ease of notation). Recall that an increasing strategy is characterized by a cutoff.
Assumption 5 For each i, if other players use increasing strategies, then EΔU(t i ) ≥ 0 implies EΔU(s i ) ≥ 0 for s i > t i and EΔ˜Ũ(t i ) > 0 implies EΔU(s i
This Assumption, together with the boundedness of payoffs, compactness of the type space and the assumption that signals have a bounded density, guarantees that an equilibrium in monotone strategies exists (see Athey (2001) Lemma 3). It also implies that any rest point of (29) is an equilibrium, that is Lemma 2 continues to hold.
To ensure convergence V must be smooth enough. Now in the two-player case, for example, V can be written as 6
It follows from the bounded convergence theorem and standard results on differentiability of integrals with respect to their limits that V will be C 2 if U(t, a) f (t) is continuously differentiable. If there are m players V will be C m . It is therefore assumed that Assumption 6 U is bounded and U and g are differentiable in t 1 and t 2 with derivatives continuous in t.
Note that the properties of φ are unimportant as it does not affect a player's choices or the learning algorithm. Assumption 6 implies that Assumption 1 is not needed. The proof can be found in the Appendix. The existence of a smooth Lyapounov function means that the restriction on the dimension state space required when payoffs are supermodular for (b) to hold is not needed.
Theorem 3
Conclusion
This paper has considered a simple set of learning rules in Bayesian games with binary actions and has shown convergence under some conditions. This provides some support for the view that equilibrium will be played in such games. On the other hand even in this simple setting players require a modicum of sophistication to learn how to play. Whether they are likely to be able to do so in more complex environments is a question for future research. and
and α n z i (n) = k i (n + 1)
From (15), z i (n) is non-zero only when the system is projected back into T i . v i (n) represents the bias in the mean from sampling at points other than k i (n). u i (n) represents the remaining noise in payoffs. By Assumption 1, H i (k 1 , k 2 ) is continuously differentiable in k 1 and k 2 for each i. In particular it is continuous and bounded.
Δy i (n) is dominated by the maximum of Δy i (0,t 0 ,t i ) and Δy i (1,t 0 ,t i ) at time n. The latter are identically and independently distributed (between periods) and by assumption are bounded. Furthermore by (11), K is bounded. Since H is also bounded and T is compact u i (n) is bounded. Let F n−1 denote the sigma-field generated by events up to and including time n − 1. It follows that E (u i (n)|F n−1 ) = 0
and
where C is a constant. These imply, using (12), that ∑ n α n u i (n) is an L 2 -bounded martingale and so almost surely
Since H i is continuously differentiable, it satisfies a Lipschitz condition. Using the change of variables s i = (t i (n) − k i (n)/h n ) in (32) and the properties of K given in (11) shows that for some constant L i ,
and so v i (n) tends to zero as n tends to infinity.
Step 2: Convergence
Step 1 established that (a) H i is Lipschitz continuous, (b) ∑ α n u i (n) converges almost surely, and (c) v i (n) tends to zero. Furthermore, (d) the projection operator is the standard projection onto a rectangular box. Also (e) E(K Δy(n) 2 ) is finite for all n (using boundedness of K and payoffs) and (f) ∑ n α 2 n < ∞ by assumptions (12)(b) and (c).
Consider the following ordinary differential equatioṅ
where z i is an inward normal vector to T i and is the smallest such vector needed to keep the system in T i .
Recall that a point x is chain recurrent for the flow Φ(x, s) (with s denoting time) of a differential equationẋ = F(x) if for any ε > 0 and S > 0, there exist points {x 0 = x, . . . , x l = x}, some l and times s i ≥ S for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that |Φ(x i−1 , s i ) − x i | < ε. The chain recurrent set is the set of all chain recurrent points. For further discussion see Benaïm (1999) or Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) . Loosely speaking the chain recurrent set is the set of points which can arise in the long-run if the flow is subject to small perturbations.
According to Theorems 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 of Kushner and Yin (1997) (See also Theorems 4.1, 5.3 and Corollary 6.11 of Benaïm (1999) ) under conditions (a) to (f) the set of limit points of k(n) is almost surely (i) a non-empty, compact, connected set invariant under the flow of (39), (ii) contained in the chain recurrent set of (39).
Assumption 4 implies that the vector field H i is inward pointing, so that z i is identically zero. (39) therefore reduces to (19) The remarks before Theorem 1 show that (19) is cooperative and irreducible. Theorem 3.3 of Benaïm (2000) shows that under these conditions when there is a unique equilibrium, k * , the chain recurrent set of (19) equals {k * }. This establishes part (a) of the Theorem. The argument of Theorem 4.3 of Benaïm (2000) shows that when, as here, the state space is two-dimensional the chain recurrent set of (19) consists solely of equilibria (see also Hirsch (1999) ). In Benaïm (2000) it is assumed that the vector field is C 2 but it only need be C 1 for this part of his results. The C 2 assumption is used to show non-convergence to unstable equilibria. This establishes part (b) of the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3
The argument is exactly as in Theorem 1 except that in the last paragraph of
Step 2 one appeals to the argument of Corollary 6.7 of Benaïm (1999) to show that the chain recurrent set consists solely of equilibria. The latter result implies that if one has a gradient systemẋ = −∇V (x) defined on an open subset of R m with V C m , x(s) defined for all s (with s denoting time) and all trajectories lying eventually in some given compact set, then the chain recurrent set consists solely of equilibria. The state space here has dimension m, the number of players, and Assumption 6 implies that V is C m , so the result follows.
